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Abstract: As part of a broad competitive intelligence strategy, ﬁrms expect to acquire informa-
tion about their rivals’ customers and production processes. In this study, we examine the ﬁrms’
incentives to disclose this information. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms adopt a policy of disclosing their infor-
mation regardless of whether it concerns a rival’s customers or production costs or whether the
ﬁrms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors. Firms that have private information about their rivals
tell. Their willingness to disclose private information about their rivals contrasts with the results
in the literature when the ﬁrm has information about itself. This literature shows that the cho-
sen disclosure policy depends on whether information is about the ﬁrm’s own payoﬀs or industry
demand and whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements.
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The burgeoning ﬁeld of competitive intelligence (CI) is speciﬁcally focused on developing
information and insight about a ﬁrm’s rivals (Prescott and Miller 2001, Carr 2003, Fuld 2006,
Liebowitz 2006, Fleisher and Bensoussan 2007). While much of the focus of CI is on learning and
analyzing the rivals’ business strategies, signiﬁcant eﬀort is expended studying the rivals’ customers
and production processes.
In this study, we seek to understand the ﬁrm’s incentives to disclose the private information
it has about its rivals. Prior literature has examined a ﬁrm’s optimal disclosure policy when the
ﬁrm has private information about its own customers or production costs.1 In the most general
analysis, Raith [1996] ﬁnds that the decision to adopt a policy of disclosure depends on whether
the ﬁrms have private information that is exclusively about their own demand or costs (the private
or independent values case) or exclusively about industry demand (the common values case) and
whether the ﬁrm’s strategies are substitutes or complements.2 In the more familiar case, the ﬁrms
adopt a policy of disclosure if they are Cournot competitors and have private information about
their own production costs or are Bertrand competitors with private information about industry
demand (Darrough 1993).
In contrast, our analysis of ﬁrms that have private information about their rival’s customers
or production costs indicates that they adopt a policy of disclosing this information regardless
of whether their strategies are substitutes or complements (whether they compete as Bertrand
or Cournot rivals): Firms that have private information about their rival tell. Intuitively, the
diﬀerence between our results and those in the prior literature arise because in our model, disclosure
decisions depend only on strategic motives. Thus, the ﬁrm’s decision depends on the eﬀect of
disclosure on its rival’s output or price (in expectation) and whether the eﬀect is valuable to the
disclosing ﬁrm. In the prior literature, the disclosure is about the ﬁrm’s own customers or costs
1 This is an extensive literature that examines incentives to adopt a policy of disclosing the ﬁrm’s private
information prior to learning it (in contrast to the segment of the disclosure literature that examines ex post
disclosure). The key studies in the ex ante disclosure literature include Gal-Or [1985, 1986], Darrough [1993]
and Raith [1996]. A nice survey is provided by Vives [2008]. Some recent contributions include Maleug and
Tsutsui [1996] who examine ex ante disclosure when the ﬁrms receive signals about the slope of the market
demand curve, Arya and Mittendorf [2007] who examine the eﬀect of third party information provides on ex
ante disclosure policy choices and Currarini and Feri [2007] who examine ex ante disclosure among subsets of
rivals.
2 The strategic substitutes case arises when a ﬁrm’s best reply is decreasing in its rival’s action (as, for example,
in Cournot competition) and the strategic complements case arises when a ﬁrm’s best reply is increasing in its
rival’s action (as, for example, in Bertrand competition). See Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer [1985] for
details.
1and is thus directly payoﬀ relevant to the disclosing ﬁrm. As a result, it has both an information
value as well as a strategic value if disclosed. That is, the disclosing ﬁrm tailors its quantity or
product price choice to this private information regardless of whether it is disclosed and, more
importantly, the rival understands this.3
We also show that our results extend to the case when the ﬁrm is uncertain as to whether its
information about its rival is, in fact, private. That is, even if there is only a chance that the ﬁrm’s
knowledge about its rival’s customers or costs is private, it optimally adopts a policy of disclosing
the information. Intuitively, even if there is only a chance that the disclosure provides the strategic
beneﬁts described above, it is worthwhile for the ﬁrm to adopt a policy of disclosure in an attempt
to capture these beneﬁts if they turn out to be available. This result is reﬂected in disclosure
policies we observe in practice. For example, Progressive Insurance is famous for its analysis of
the insurance risks posed by both its own and its rivals’ customers—and for providing access to
this analysis on its website by disclosing its own and some rivals’ quotes for diﬀerent customer
proﬁles (Davenport and Harris 2007). Pharmaceutical companies regularly provide information on
the eﬃcacy of a drug or class of drugs that its rivals may be studying in presentations at scientiﬁc
and/or professional conferences (Prescott and Miller 2001, Carr 2003, Fuld 2006, Liebowitz 2006,
Fleisher and Bensoussan 2007). Similarly, oil companies often publicly discuss/disclose seismic
information that relates to drilling costs in a particular location that a rival is beginning to explore
or in ﬁelds where the ﬁrm and its rivals are drilling (Bower 2009). More recently, AT&T publicly
discussed how smart phone usage strains data networks just as Verizon introduced the ﬁrst high–
end mobile phone powered by Google’s Android operating system.
We should also note that CI practitioners are encouraged to sift through ﬁnancial disclosures
(both mandatory and voluntary) of their ﬁrm’s rivals and to attend conferences where rivals are
presenting (Prescott and Miller 2001, Carr 2003, Fuld 2006, Liebowitz 2006, Fleisher and Ben-
soussan 2007). These activities of CI professionals oﬀer the rival a simple means to communicate
any information it may have gathered about the ﬁrm. Thus, our results suggest that information
about a ﬁrm’s customers or costs may be found in the mandatory and voluntary disclosures of its
rivals. They also suggest that regulators need not be overly concerned about the need to substitute
mandatory for voluntary disclosure of this type of information.
3 More formally, if the ﬁrm has private information about its own customers or production costs, it can tailor
its choice of output or price to this information. This makes the payoﬀ from not disclosing larger than if the
ﬁrm has private information about its rival which does not directly aﬀect the ﬁrm’s own payoﬀs.
2Our results also have implications for the information transfer literature. This literature
focuses on changes in rival ﬁrms’ stock prices following announcements by a competitor (Baginski
1987, Pownall and Waymire 1989, Ramnath 2002, Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson 2008 or Kim,
Lacina and Park 2008). Whether the announcement is an earnings announcement, management
guidance, a restatement or some other type of ﬁnancial disclosure, the idea is that if one ﬁrm
reports its ﬁnancial performance, that information can be used to make inferences about its rivals’
ﬁnancial performance. Our results suggest that in some of its disclosures, a ﬁrm may also be
oﬀering information that is directly relevant to understanding its rivals’ performance—inferences
may not be needed. If so, then distinguishing the diﬀerent information channels may allow for a
clearer understanding of any information externalities associated with ﬁnancial disclosures.
Finally, to complete our analysis, we consider a ﬁrm making a disclosure choice after learning
private information about its rival as opposed to making the choice ex ante. We ﬁnd that the
standard results obtain. If there are no costs to disclosure, the unique equilibrium has the ﬁrm
disclosing its private information about its rival’s customers or production costs regardless of the
realization of that information. That is, we get the standard unraveling result (Grossman 1981,
Milgrom 1981). However, if there is a cost to disclosure as in Verrecchia [1983], we ﬁnd that the
ﬁrm only discloses its private information if it is suﬃciently good news for the disclosing ﬁrm.
Interestingly, whether this disclosure is good or bad news for the rival depends on both whether
the ﬁrm has private information about the rival’s customers or production costs and whether the
ﬁrms are Bertrand or Cournot competitors. Lastly, we show that the probability of of a voluntary
disclosure depends on both whether the rival discloses and on how close substitutes the products
the ﬁrms make are. Thus, our analysis suggests a new reason why there is likely to be industry
clustering of voluntary disclosures and oﬀers a new prediction that such disclosures are more likely
in industries where ﬁrms sell more similar products and less likely in those industries that use
diﬀerentiation strategies.
Although our analysis is most closely related to the literature on voluntary disclosure policy
choice, italso complements a related literature on mandatory disclosures and earnings management.
These studies endogenize the beneﬁts of biased mandatory disclosures by examining their eﬀects
on the capital market’s estimate of ﬁrm value (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000, Fischer and Stocken
2004, Stocken and Verrecchia 2004), on competition in the ﬁrm’s product market (Fischer and
Verrecchia 2004, Bagnoli and Watts 2010), or on contracting with the ﬁrm’s manager (Arya,
3Glover and Sunder 1998). Our work complements this literature by endogenizing the beneﬁts
from voluntary disclosure of private information about a rival by examining the eﬀects of such
voluntary disclosures on product market competition. Our ﬁnding that ﬁrms with this type of
private information tell suggests, as mentioned above, that there is likely no need to make such
disclosures mandatory. Further, even though there would be a similar short–term incentive to bias
these types of disclosures as well, the fact that the disclosed information would eventually become
known to the rival at a future date suggests that the arguments in Stocken [2000] could be used
to show that it is unlikely that issues of bias would plague these types of disclosures.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a description of our
model of disclosure policy and describes the equilibrium policy choices. In Section 3, we extend
the analysis to examine the eﬀect of ﬁrms making disclosure choices after learning their private
information about their rival, and we conclude in Section 4.
2. Model
There are a variety of situations in which a ﬁrm has private information about its rival, and
these are frequently the result of speciﬁc competitive intelligence (CI) activities designed to develop
intelligence about the ﬁrm’s rivals. Our objective is to extend our understanding of a company’s
willingness to disclose private information to the case when the ﬁrm has private information about
a competitor. Prior work (Gal–Or 1985, 1986, Darrough 1993, Raith 1996, summarized in Vives
2008) focuses on a company’s willingness to disclose private information about itself (the so–called
private or independent values case) or information that aﬀects the payoﬀs of both ﬁrms (the so–
called common values case). In addition to showing that the ﬁrms’ disclosure policy adoption
decisions depend on which type of private information the ﬁrm has, this literature also shows that
the decision depends on whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements (generally
whether the ﬁrms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors). In both the independent and common
values cases, the strategic reasons for disclosure—aﬀecting the rival’s behavior in the product
market—are obscured by the information eﬀects of the disclosure. That is, the disclosure reveals
value–relevant information about the ﬁrm as well as aﬀecting the strategic choices of the ﬁrm’s
rival.
Our information structure ﬁts neither the independent nor common values structure previously
studied. Instead, we focus on the disclosure of private information about a rival’s customers
4or production costs.4 In addition to examining the disclosure of an important type of private
information, our analysis allows us to focus on strategic motives for adopting a disclosure policy
separately from the informationeﬀect of the policy. That is, in the prior literature, if the ﬁrm adopts
a policy of disclosure, there are strategic eﬀects in that the disclosure alters how the ﬁrm’s rival
competes in the product market. There is also an information eﬀect—the disclosing ﬁrm reveals
payoﬀ–relevant information about itself. With our information structure, if the ﬁrm discloses its
private information, it provides payoﬀ–relevant information about its rival to its rival, and this
allows us to focus on the strategic motives behind the disclosure policy choice.
To highlight the importance of having private information about a rival on the choice of dis-
closure policy, we employ virtually the same structure for our model as used when the independent
and common values cases are analyzed. In particular, we assume that there are two ﬁrms that
choose a disclosure policy prior to acquiring their private information. Subsequently, they follow
their chosen disclosure policy and then compete in the product market. See Figure 1 for a time
line summarizing the order of events in our model. As is standard, we will analyze two versions of
competition in the product market—one in which the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors and one in
which they are Bertrand competitors.
More formally, let di ∈{ D,N} represent the chosen disclosure policy where D (N)r e p r e s e n t s
the choice to commit to disclose (not disclose). Each ﬁrm makes its disclosure choice without
knowing the choice of its rival. Subsequently, the ﬁrms acquire their private information and
then follow their chosen disclosure policies. Everything except the ﬁrms’ private information is
common knowledge. As a result, there are (potentially) two sources of information available to
each ﬁrm. First, each ﬁrm is endowed with private information. Second, each ﬁrm may have its
private information augmented by the information disclosure of its rival. We assume that, if made,
t h ed i s c l o s u r ei st r u t h f u l . 5 Thus, the information used when the ﬁrms compete depends on their
prior choices of disclosure policy. Finally, the two ﬁrms compete in their product market by selling
4 Private information about a rival’s customers or production costs diﬀers from the independent values case
because the ﬁrm’s private information is not directly payoﬀ–relevant to the ﬁrm—if disclosed, it only has a
strategic value. Similarly, it diﬀers from the common values case because the private information does not
provide a better understanding of a payoﬀ–relevant parameter that aﬀects both ﬁrms’ payoﬀs directly.
5 When the ﬁrm’s private information is about its own customers or costs, the assumption that the disclosure is
truthful is potentially problematic. In our setting, it is less troubling because it is reasonable to assume that the
rival will eventually learn the information that pertains to its customers or costs that is currently only known
by the ﬁrm choosing whether or not to disclose. In this case, because the information is eventually acquired,
arguments in Stocken [2000] can be used to support an equilibrium in which the ﬁrms disclose truthfully if
they disclose at all.
5heterogeneous products. The demands for their products are:6
(1) pi = ai − qi − tqj i =1 ,2; j  = i,
with 1 >t>0 to reﬂect the fact that the ﬁrms sell products consumers view as substitutes.7 We
also assume that each ﬁrm has constant marginal costs of production ci and no ﬁxed costs. Each
ﬁrm competes by choosing an amount to sell (Cournot competition) or a price to charge (Bertrand
competition) and each seeks to maximize expected proﬁts conditional on their information.
The above structure is the standard one used in this literature (e.g., Gal–Or 1985, 1986, Dar-
rough 1993, Raith 1996) but our information environment is diﬀerent.8 To highlight the diﬀerence,
we make the extreme assumption that ﬁrm i knows aj and/or cj and that ﬁrm j does not know
those values unless disclosed by ﬁrm i. Assuming that ﬁrm j knows nothing about the intercept
of its demand and/or marginal costs while its rival is fully informed about them is extreme and
done solely to highlight the strategic issues of disclosure commitments. If either ﬁrm had private
information about its own demand or cost structure, the strategic reasons for committing to dis-
closure or not would be obscured by the direct information eﬀects of their private information (and
its impact on their disclosure policy choices). We should also note that any additional, common
knowledge components of the intercept or cost terms would not aﬀect our analysis of the ﬁrms’
disclosure policy choices. That is, our results would be completely unaﬀected by assuming that
there was a common knowledge term in the ﬁrm’s intercept aj +αj or costs cj +κj where αj and
κj are common knowledge and so we suppress them purely for notational simplicity.
Prior to learning their private information, the ﬁrms have common priors. That is, both
believe that the variables are drawn from known distributions with ﬁnite means and variances.
Again to highlight the eﬀects of disclosures of private information about a rival, we further assume
that all four variables (a1,a 2,c 1 and c2) are independent. In particular, this implies that ﬁrm
i’s private information is independent of ﬁrm j’s private information—the distribution of ai given
6 These demands can be readily derived following the analysis in Vives [1984].
7 Products are substitutes if an increase in the amount sold by one ﬁrm reduces the amount sold by the other.
Note that this concept diﬀers from the idea of strategic substitutes or complements mentioned previously. The
ﬁrms’ decisions are strategic substitutes (complements) if a ﬁrm’s best reply is increasing (decreasing) in the
rival’s decision. Thus, the idea of strategic substitutes and complements focuses on the strategic interaction
between ﬁrms as opposed to consumers’ perceptions of the products.
8 To support the diﬀerence in information structures, we have generalized the demand functions for the ﬁrms’
products to permit the ﬁrms to face diﬀerent demand intercepts.
6(aj,c j) and the distribution of ci given (aj,c j) are both independent of (aj,c j).9 To avoid problems
with corner solutions, we assume that the smallest value of the intercept parameter for each ﬁrm
exceeds the largest value that ﬁrm’s marginal costs can take on.10
Given this structure, we turn to solving the model. As usual, we begin by solving the second–
stage of the game, when the ﬁrms compete in the product market. In Section 2.1, we assume that
the ﬁrms compete by choosing quantities (Cournot competition), and then in Section 2.2 we assume
that they compete by choosing prices (Bertrand competition). In both cases, we examine the eﬀect
of having private information about the rival’s cost and demand parameters. Our objective is to
allow for a comparison to the prior literature which shows that the decision to commit to disclose
depends on both the form of competition in the product market (Cournot or Bertrand) and on
whether the ﬁrms have private information about their own demand or cost parameters.
2.1 Cournot Competition
Under Cournot competition, each ﬁrm chooses its proﬁt–maximizing quantity after learning
its private information and any information disclosed by its rival and after following the disclosure
strategy it chose prior to learning its private information. Thus, its decisions depend on its own
private information (what it knows about its rival: aj or cj), the disclosure strategy chosen by
its rival, dj, the information that the rival’s strategy requires disclosing, and its own disclosure
strategy, di. As a result, there are sixteen possible information sets for ﬁrm i which we will represent
by φi.11
Thus, ﬁrm i solves maxqi E[(ai − qi − tqj − ci)qi | φi] which yields the ﬁrst order condition
qi =( 1 /2)E[(ai−tqj−ci) | φi]. The usual calculations yield the following Proposition that describes
equilibrium quantity choices and proﬁts in the second stage of our game.
9 These distributional assumptions diﬀer from those made in the prior literature (i.e., the random variables are
normally distributed) and are made to simplify the analysis.
10 Formally, we assume that ai ∈ [a 
i,a h
i ]a n dci ∈ [c 
i,c h
i ]w i t hch
i <a  
i for i =1 ,2.
11 The sixteen possible information sets are found by crossing the alternative private information combinations
{(aj,a i),(aj,c i),(cj,a i),(cj,c i)} with the diﬀerent combinations of disclosure strategies the ﬁrms chose prior
to learning their private information {(D,D),(D,N),(N,D),(N,N)}.























2E[ai] − tE[aj] − 2E[ci]+tE[cj]

and equilibrium proﬁts in this stage of the game are πC
i (di,d j)=[ qi(di,d j)]2 for i =1 ,2;j  = i.
The equilibrium quantities described in Proposition 1 highlight the importance of the diﬀerence
in our information structure relative to that used in the prior literature on disclosure policy choices.
The only results that are the same in our model and the prior literature occur when both ﬁrms have
committed to disclose because in this case, both ﬁrms become fully informed regardless of whether
their private information is about their own or their rival’s demand or costs. In the remaining cases,
the equilibrium quantities diﬀer from the prior literature because of the information structure that
we consider. To see why, note that in our analysis, a ﬁrm only becomes perfectly informed about
its own demand (cost) parameter from its rival’s disclosure policy. If the ﬁrm’s rival chooses not to
disclose, the ﬁrm does not know its own demand (cost) parameter and thus cannot tailor its sales
to the particular realization.
This is seen most clearly when neither ﬁrm commits to disclose. In this case, neither has
usable payoﬀ– or strategic–relevant information. To see why, note that because each ﬁrm’s private
information is about its rival’s demand or cost parameters, without disclosure, the rival does not
know these values and therefore cannot tailor its sales to the particular realizations. Since each ﬁrm
knows this, it knows that its rival’s quantity will not depend on these parameters, and therefore
its own quantity won’t depend on them either. As a result, each ﬁrm knows that its rival will
make its output decision using only its priors. This diﬀers from the results when a ﬁrm has private
information about its own demand or costs because that information would be used by the ﬁrm
to tailor its output choice to the particular realizations even when the decision to not disclose
eliminates the strategic eﬀects of the disclosure.
Proposition 1 also highlights a key diﬀerence from the prior literature that will be important
when we consider the ﬁrms’ disclosure policy decisions. In particular, the information and strategic
8impacts of disclosure diﬀer. In the standard version where the ﬁrm has private information about
its own demand or costs, that information is useful independent of the disclosure decision because
the ﬁrm has the ability to tailor its quantity choice to its own private information. In addition to
this direct beneﬁt, there is also a strategic eﬀect associated with the disclosure of the ﬁrm’s private
information. If the ﬁrm discloses its private information, it informs its rival about its own payoﬀs
and about how it will respond to changes in the rival’s quantity choice. The important point is
that the consequences of the strategic eﬀects are measured relative to the quantity choice that the
ﬁrm tailors to its private information.
In our case, the private information is not inherently useful independent of the disclosure
decision: There is only a strategic eﬀect associated with the disclosure. The ﬁrm cannot directly
use its private information about its rival’s customers or costs because the information doesn’t
directly aﬀect the disclosing ﬁrm’s payoﬀs. Instead, all beneﬁts and costs from disclosure ﬂow
through the eﬀects on the rival’s quantity choice from being able to tailor that choice to the
information provided by the disclosing ﬁrm.
2.2 Bertrand Competition
To compare equilibrium disclosure policies when ﬁrms are Bertrand rather than Cournot
competitors, we now assume that the ﬁrms compete in the product market by choosing prices. To
keep the comparison as clear as possible, we maintain the information structure, and all of the
alternative prior disclosure decision possibilities are the same. The only diﬀerence is that each ﬁrm
chooses its proﬁt–maximizing price rather than its proﬁt–maximizing quantity.
We begin by inverting the demand curves, equations (1), to obtain
(2) qi = ξ

ai − taj − pi + tpj

i =1 ,2; j  = i,
where ξ ≡ 1/(1 − t2). The form of these demand curves highlights an issue that needs to be ad-
dressed. The descriptions of market demands contained in equations (1) diﬀer from the descriptions
in equations (2) because the intercepts in the latter depend on both ai and aj. This diﬀerence
arises because, under Bertrand competition, when one ﬁrm lowers its product’s price, sales rise for
two reasons. First, the price reduction leads to new consumers entering the market and buying the
ﬁrm’s product. Second, the price reduction causes some consumers who were choosing to buy the
rival’s product to switch and buy this ﬁrm’s product. Under Cournot competition, added sales only
9arise from the ﬁrst source—a ﬁrm that increases sales does so only by attracting new customers
into the market and not by “stealing away” some of its rival’s customers.
Unfortunately, this diﬀerence means that a ﬁrm’s private information about aj is no longer
solely about its rival’s customers. To continue to allow us to focus on the case when there is only
a strategic value to disclosure without eliminating the linkage between the demand structures, we
introduce an additional parameter to the demand functions, m, in equations (2) which can take on
the values of one and zero. This will allow us to consider both the case when there is only strategic
value to disclosure (m = 0) and the case when the demand functions are exactly the inverse of
those used when we examined Cournot competition (m =1 ) . 12 Thus, we adjust equations (2) to
become:
(2a) qi = ξ

ai − mtaj − pi + tpj

i =1 ,2; j  = i,
where, again, ξ ≡ 1/(1 − t2).
As a result, ﬁrm i solves maxpi E[ξ

ai − mtaj − pi + tpj

(pi − ci) | φi] which yields the ﬁrst
order condition pi = 1
2ξE[(ai −mtaj +tpj +ξci) | φi]. Again, we rely on the ﬁrm’s information, φi,
to distinguish the alternative cases and the usual calculations yield the following Proposition.

















(2 − mt2)ai +( t/2)((4− t2)maj






(2 − mt2)E[ai] − (t/2)((4− t2)maj
− (2 − mt2)E[aj])+ 2E[ci]+tE[cj]

and equilibrium proﬁts in this stage of the game are πB
i (di,d j)=( 1
ξ)

pi(di,d j) − E[ci | φi]
2
for
i =1 ,2;j  = i.
12 Note that assuming that m = 0 does not change the fact that the ﬁrms’ strategies are complements when the
compete on price.
10As before, diﬀerences between our results and the prior literature arise when there are dif-
ferences in the information the ﬁrms have when choosing prices. In particular, when the demand
intercepts depend on both ﬁrms’ private information (m = 1), we are essentially in the common
values case examined previously and obtain similar results.13 In contrast, when the ﬁrms only have
strategic reasons for disclosure (their private information is purely about their rival’s customers or
costs, m = 0), diﬀerences arise except when both ﬁrms have chosen to disclose their private infor-
mation. As in the Cournot case, if they both disclose, then both ﬁrms have complete information
about the market and the two ﬁrms’ costs and so the results are (essentially) the same as in the
prior literature.
However, when one or both ﬁrms choose not to disclose their private information, diﬀerences
in equilibrium prices arise. Similar to the Cournot case, the reason is that when ﬁrms have private
information about their rival, there is only a strategic value to disclosure. The ﬁrm’s private
information is not directly payoﬀ–relevant. This is most apparent when one considers pi(N,N)
which depends on neither ﬁrm’s private information. If neither has chosen to disclose its private
information, neither provides its rival with payoﬀ–relevant information and so the rival’s action
(price) cannot depend on the non–disclosed information. Since the rival’s action doesn’t depend
on the ﬁrm’s private information and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ doesn’t directly depend on its private
information, the ﬁrm’s action (price) doesn’t depend on the information either. Thus, equilibrium
price choices obtained under our information structure when m = 0 diﬀer from equilibrium prices
obtained under the information structure used in the prior literature.
Having determined equilibrium quantities or prices in the second stage of the game, we turn
to the ﬁrst stage and examine under what conditions the ﬁrms choose to commit to disclose.
2.3 Disclosure Choices
The equilibrium quantities and prices described in Propositions 1 and 2 describe equilibrium
behavior conditional on the ﬁrms having learned their private information and conditional on
following the alternative disclosure policy choices that they may have made. To determine the
conditions under which the ﬁrms voluntarily commit to disclose their private information once they
learn it, we must examine their ex ante disclosure incentives.14 Because we use the equilibrium
13 Again, we note that the only diﬀerences arise because we generalize the demand structure to allow the two
ﬁrms to face demands with diﬀerent intercepts.
14 In the extensions section, we discuss voluntary disclosure choices when they are made after the ﬁrm learns its
11choices described in Propositions 1 and 2, we can describe the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of our two–stage game as the equilibrium of the associated normal form game whose payoﬀs are














Comparisons of expected proﬁts will depend on the ex ante variance of the demand or cost
parameters because proﬁts are proportional to the square of sales (Proposition 1) or the square of
the ﬁrm’s mark–up (Proposition 2). This is why we needed to assume that the random variables
had ﬁnite variances. Given this, the main result of our analysis is presented in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1:( a ) When the ﬁrms’ private information is purely about its rival (m =0 ), then re-
gardless of whether the ﬁrms have private information about demand or costs,
and regardless of whether they are Bertrand or Cournot competitors, in the
unique equilibrium, both ﬁrms adopt the policy of disclosing their private in-
formation.
(b) When m =1 , the ﬁrm’s private information is about its rival’s market demand
and the ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors, in the unique equilibrium, neither ﬁrm
adopts the policy of disclosing its private information.
Theorem 1 highlights the importance of the information structure to the ﬁrms’ equilibrium
disclosure policy choices. In particular, prior literature (Gal-Or 1985, 1986, Darrough 1993, Raith
1996, Vives 2008) informs us that when ﬁrms have private information about their own pay-
oﬀs, their disclosure policy choice depends on whether they have private information about their
customers or their costs and whether they compete by choosing prices or quantities. Darrough
[1993] shows that ﬁrms opt to disclose if they have private information about their own costs and
are Cournot competitors or if they have private information about their own customers and are
Bertrand competitors. They opt to not disclose if they have private information about their own
costs and are Bertrand competitors or private information about their own customers and are
private information.
15 We use k = C,B to designate whether the ﬁrms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors.
12Cournot competitors.16 In contrast, in our model, each ﬁrm has payoﬀ–relevant information about
its rival and, so long as the information is solely about its rival’s payoﬀs, the unique equilibrium
involves each ﬁrm adopting the policy of disclosing its private information. While having informa-
tion that is payoﬀ–relevant to the ﬁrm’s rival is a key feature of the common values set–up, our
setting diﬀers from the common values setting because, in our setting, the private information is
not directly payoﬀ–relevant to the ﬁrm itself.
The diﬀerence in results has three important implications. First, for policy makers who are
concerned about the need to substitute mandatory for voluntary disclosure, the suggested trade–
oﬀ between the beneﬁts of disclosure and the costs associated with being placed at a competitive
disadvantage relative to one’s rivals seems to be unimportant when considering disclosure of private
information about one’s rival. That is, while prior literature has shown that there are cases in
which regulators desiring disclosure are likely to have to intervene, for example, in the details of
the information included in the ﬁrm’s MD&A, intervention is not required if the ﬁrm has private
information about its rival. The ﬁrm will voluntarily commit to providing this information to the
market.
A consequence of this is that our analysis oﬀers an additional explanation for information
transfers—changes in rival ﬁrms’ stock prices following an announcement by a competitor.17 The
literature that studies this phenomenon basically takes the view that disclosures by a ﬁrm about its
ﬁnancial performance can be used by the market to make inferences about the ﬁnancial performance
of the ﬁrm’s rivals. Our results suggest the possibility that the disclosing ﬁrm is also directly
providing information about the ﬁnancial performance of its rivals. As a result, it may be useful to
analyze the two disclosure channels separately to attain a clearer understanding of the information
externalities associated with ﬁnancial disclosures.
Second, our analysis suggests that many of the issues believed to be central to the ﬁrm’s
decision to adopt a disclosure policy are speciﬁc to disclosure of private information about itself. As
16 These results are generalized in Raith [1996] who shows that the disclosure policy choice depends on the
nature of the ﬁrms’ private information (common values or independent values), the correlation in the ﬁrms’
private information and whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements.
17 There is an extensive empirical literature on information transfer. For example, Ramnath [2002] studies stock
price reactions around earnings announcements; Bagniski [1987] and Kim, Lacina and Park [2008] focus on
reactions around management guidance; Pownall and Waymire [1989] and the discussion by Dietrich [1989]
focus on the interaction between earnings information transfer and management guidance; and Gleason, Jenkins
and Johnson [2008] focus on reactions around accounting restatements.
13mentioned previously, when the private information is about the ﬁrm’s own payoﬀs, the decision to
adopt a policy of disclosure depends on whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements
and whether the private information is of the independent values form or the common values form.
None of these issues are important when the ﬁrm’s private information is solely about its rival’s
customers or production costs.
Intuitively, the diﬀerence arises because of diﬀerences in the payoﬀs to adopting a policy of
not disclosing the ﬁrm’s private information. In our case, the ﬁrm’s private information is about its
rival’s customers or production costs and cannot be used to tailor the ﬁrm’s own price or quantity
because it is information about the rival. It can be used only if the ﬁrm adopts a policy of disclosure.
In contrast, when the ﬁrm has private information about its own customers or production costs, it
is able to tailor its price of quantity choice to that information whether or not it adopts a policy
of disclosure. Thus, the payoﬀ from adopting a policy of not disclosing depends on whether the
ﬁrm has private information about its rival or itself.
More speciﬁcally, this payoﬀ is smaller in expectation when the ﬁrm has private information
about its rival because ﬁrm proﬁts are convex in the value of the demand intercept and in the
ﬁrm’s costs of production. Convexity ensures that the expected payoﬀ from the ﬁrm knowing that
it can tailor its output (price) to its private information when acquired exceeds the expected payoﬀ
from the ﬁrm knowing that it cannot and simply setting its output (price) based on its expectation
of its demand and/or cost parameters. Thus when comparing the advantages of adopting a policy
of disclosure to a policy of not disclosing, the payoﬀ associated with not disclosing is greater when
the ﬁrm’s output or price choice can be tailored to its private information. As a result, it less likely
that the ﬁrm adopts a policy of disclosing its private information when it is about the ﬁrm’s own
customers or production costs. This diﬀerence plays an important role in explaining the diﬀerence
in the ﬁrm’s willingness to adopt a policy of disclosure when it has private information about its
rival rather than itself.
Third, the disclosure policy choices are surprisingly robust. In equilibrium, the ﬁrms adopt
a policy of disclosure if (1) they both have private information about their rival’s customers,
(2) they both have private information about their rival’s production costs, or (3) one has private
information about their rival’s customers while the other has private information about the rival’s
production costs.
14We should also note an interesting feature of the ﬁrms’ disclosure policy decisions that becomes
clear when examining the proof of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1: Optimal disclosure policy choices do not depend on either how precise the ﬁrm’s
private information is nor on how similar the products the ﬁrms sell are (the value of t).
Finally, we note that our results when m = 1 diﬀer from the prior literature (Darrough 1993).
Recall that when m = 1, each ﬁrm’s private information about the rival’s customers is payoﬀ
relevant to both ﬁrms because, if ﬁrm i lowers its price, its sales rise for two reasons. First, more
consumers are willing to buy the ﬁrm’s product, and second some of the rival’s customers switch
and now buy from ﬁrm i. Thus, information about its rival’s customers is directly payoﬀ relevant to
ﬁrm i. This does not, however, produce the common values structure analyzed by Darrough [1993]
and Raith [1996]. In their models, larger realizations of one ﬁrm’s private information is associated
with increased demand for both ﬁrms. When ﬁrms have private information about their rival’s
customers (and m = 1), a larger realization of the ﬁrm’s private information is associated with
increased demand for the ﬁrm’s rival but decreased demand for the informed ﬁrm. This diﬀerence
is why when ﬁrms have private information about industry demand and are Bertrand competitors,
they adopt a policy of disclosing their private information whereas, in our model, when ﬁrms have
private information about the rival’s customers, m = 1 and they are Bertrand competitors, they
adopt a policy of not disclosing their private information.
Our analysis, while most closely related to literature on the choice of voluntary disclosure
policy, complements the theoretical literature on earnings management. In that literature, the
beneﬁts of biased mandatory disclosures are endogenized by examining their eﬀects on the capital
market’s estimate of ﬁrm value (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000, Fischer and Stocken 2004, Stocken
and Verrecchia 2004), on competition in the ﬁrm’s product market (Fischer and Verrecchia 2004,
Bagnoli and Watts 2010), or on contracting with the ﬁrm’s manager (Arya, Glover and Sunder
1998). In addition to the showing that there are beneﬁts to managing earnings, this literature also
shows that it arises in equilibrium only if the agents observing the earnings reports are unable
to fully undo any introduced bias. Our analysis complements this literature in two ways. First,
we show that product market competition also provides incentives to disclose private information
about a ﬁrm’s rival. In fact, we show that the incentives are stronger than they are when the
ﬁrm’s private information is about its own customers or production costs. Second, because any
disclosure about a rival’s customers or production costs is likely veriﬁable by that rival in the future,
15the arguments in Stocken [2000] could be adapted to show that it is unlikely that these disclosures
would be biased. Thus, when the ﬁrm’s private information is about its rival’s customers or costs,
it is expected to be disclosed and disclosed without introducing bias.
3. Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions to our analysis. First, we consider the eﬀect of
allowing a ﬁrm to be uncertain as to whether or not the information it has acquired about the
rival is, in fact, private. Second, we consider a version of our model in which the ﬁrms make
disclosure decisions after they have learned their private information and thus are not committing
to a disclosure policy.
3.1 Uncertainty about the private nature of the ﬁrms’ information
While ﬁrms can invest in competitive intelligence gathering that produces information about
a rival’s customers and/or production costs, it is much more diﬃcult for the ﬁrm to be sure that
the information uncovered is unknown to the rival. In the previous section, the analysis assumes
that the information uncovered is, in fact, private information. In this subsection, we extend our
analysis to include the possibility that the ﬁrm’s information is already known to the rival.
We maintain all of the assumptions made previously but augment them by assuming that the
ﬁrm’s information is private with probability ρi > 0. For any disclosure choice by the ﬁrm’s rival
(dj), ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from adopting a policy of disclosure is
ρiEk
i[πi(D,dj)] + (1 − ρi)Ek
i[πi(D,dj)],
and ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from adopting a policy of not disclosing is
ρiEk
i[πi(N,dj)] + (1− ρi)Ek
i[πi(D,dj)].
Since the second terms in the two expressions are the same, comparing them is equivalent to
comparing Ek
i [πi(D,dj)] and Ek
i [πi(N,dj)]. Since this is exactly the comparison behind the proof
o fT h e o r e m1 ,w eh a v es h o w n
Proposition 3: When the ﬁrm’s information is purely about its rival (m =0 ), as long as there
is a positive probability that this information is private (ρi > 0), then regardless of whether the
ﬁrms have private information about demand or costs, and regardless of whether they are Bertrand
or Cournot competitors, in the unique equilibrium, both ﬁrms adopt the policy of disclosing their
private information.
16Intuitively, the ﬁrm’s disclosure choice is based only on the possibility that its information is,
in fact, private. Consequently, we obtain the same result as before: As long as there is a chance that
the ﬁrm’s information is private, it adopts a policy of disclosing its information about its rival’s
customers or production costs regardless of whether strategies are substitutes or complements (i.e.,
whether the ﬁrms are Bertrand or Cournot competitors in their product markets). Firms that may
have private information about their rival tell.
3.2 Ex Post Disclosure
To allow for easier comparisons between the analyses of ex ante and ex post disclosure, we
maintain all of the assumptions about product market competition made previously but focus only
on the case when m = 0, when the ﬁrm’s private information is solely about its rival’s customers
or production costs. Figure 2 provides a time line of events.
Since disclosure models of this type are analyzed separately for each ﬁrm, we proceed by
analyzing a ﬁrm’s disclosure choice given a choice by its rival. Our ﬁrst result conﬁrms that in
our setting, the standard unraveling result holds (Grossman 1981, Milgrom 1981) much as it does
when the ﬁrms have private information about their own payoﬀs (Christensen and Feltham 2002).
That is, without costs of disclosure or uncertainty about whether the ﬁrm actually does have any
information at all, the unique equilibrium is to voluntarily disclose the ﬁrm’s private information
regardless of its type or realization.
Lemma 1: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private in-
formation. If there are no costs to disclosure and no uncertainty about whether the ﬁrm has any
information at all, the unique voluntary disclosure equilibrium involves the ﬁrm disclosing its pri-
vate information regardless of whether it has private information about its rival’s customers or
production costs, regardless of whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements, and
regardless of whether its rival does or does not disclose its private information.
Verrecchia [1983] shows that the unraveling result disappears if there is a cost of disclosure
that is not prohibitive and Dye [1985] shows that it disappears if the market is uncertain that the
disclosing ﬁrm actually has private information. In either case, the ﬁrm is assumed to have private
information about its own payoﬀs and the common result is that the ﬁrm voluntarily discloses
its private information if it is suﬃciently good news.18 The following Theorem shows that this
result extends to the case when the ﬁrm has private information about its rival’s customers or
18 Recently, Arya, Frimor and Mittendorf [2010] have shown that the unraveling result can also disappear if the
disclosing ﬁrm competes in multiple product markets.
17production costs. To simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a positive but not prohibitive
cost to disclosure, κ, and that the distributions reﬂecting the ﬁrms’ priors are log–concave so as to
ensure that conditional expectations are monotone.19
Theorem 2: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private
information. If costs of disclosure are not prohibitive, the ﬁrm voluntarily discloses its private
information if it is suﬃciently good news for the ﬁrm regardless of whether it has private informa-
tion about its rival’s customers or production costs, regardless of whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are
substitutes or complements, and regardless of whether its rival does or does not disclose its private
information.
The result described in Theorem 2 is consistent with prior voluntary disclosure models of this
type (Verrecchia 2001, Dye 2001) in that the disclosing ﬁrm voluntarily discloses good news. What
is interesting about our result is that good news for the disclosing ﬁrm may or may not be good
news for its rival. To see why, consider the case of a Cournot competitor with private information
about its rival’s production costs. Good news for the disclosing ﬁrm is represented by larger than
expected production costs for its rival—which is bad news for the rival. Similarly, if the ﬁrm’s
private information is about the rival’s customers, good news for the disclosing ﬁrm is represented
by a smaller demand for the rival’s product, which is again bad news for the rival. However, if the
ﬁrm is a Bertrand competitor with private information about its rival’s customers, good news for
the disclosing ﬁrm is represented by greater demand for the rival’s product—which is also good
news for the rival.
Corollary 2: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private
information. If costs of disclosure are not prohibitive and the ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors,
the probability that the ﬁrm chooses to voluntarily disclose its private information about its rival
is increasing in how close substitutes the ﬁrms’ products are (how large t is). If the ﬁrm’s are
Cournot competitors, the result holds so long as the ﬁrms’ markets are suﬃciently similar.20
Intuitively, the more similar the ﬁrms’ products are, the greater is the strategic beneﬁt asso-
ciated with providing information the ﬁrm has about its rival’s customers or costs. The strategic
beneﬁts from disclosing a ﬁrm’s private information to its rival is that the rival responds to the
new information in a manner that ultimately beneﬁts the disclosing ﬁrm. For example, if it is
disclosed that the rival’s costs are higher than it expected, the rival reduces the amount it wishes
to sell (or increases the price it wishes to charge if the ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors) thereby
19 See Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2005] for examples of distributions that are log–concave.
20 “Suﬃciently similar” means that E[ai − ci | dj]/(aj − cj) >t (4 + t2)/(4 + 3t2).
18increasing the disclosing ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The impact of the disclosure is greater the more closely the
ﬁrms’ products substitute for one another. As a result, set of values the ﬁrm wishes to disclose
increases and so the probability of a voluntary disclosure rises.
Corollary 2 also oﬀers an interesting empirical prediction. It suggests that the probability
of a voluntary disclosure is greater for ﬁrms that sell more similar products. Thus, ﬁrms that
sell products that are diﬃcult to diﬀerentiate from one another are more likely to oﬀer voluntary
disclosure of informationabout their rival than ﬁrms that compete but sell more easily diﬀerentiated
products. Since some ﬁrms compete using diﬀerentiation strategies while others adopt a cost
leadership strategy, Corollary 2 suggests that there will be less voluntary disclosure among the
ﬁrst set of ﬁrms and more among the second.
4. Conclusions
Businesses are putting ever greater emphasis on competitive intelligence (CI): the process of
developing information and insight about their rivals with the objective of identifying strategic
advantages (Carr 2003, Fuld 2006, Liebowitz 2006, Fleisher and Bensoussan 2007). As part of
the CI process, a ﬁrm is likely to acquire private information about its rivals’ customers and/or
production processes. Our objective is to understand the ﬁrm’s incentives to disclose this type of
private information.
Prior work (Gal–Or 1985, 1986, Darrough 1993, Raith 1996) focuses on disclosure policies
when ﬁrms have private information about their own customers or production costs (the indepen-
dent values case) or information about industry demand (the common values case), not private
information about their rivals. This literature shows that the decision to adopt a policy of disclos-
ing this information depends on the nature of the private information (whether it pertains to the
ﬁrm’s own customers or costs or whether pertains to industry demand) and whether the ﬁrms are
Cournot or Bertrand competitors (Darrough 1993).21
In contrast, we ﬁnd that when ﬁrms have private information about their rivals, they adopt a
policy of disclosing that information regardless of the nature of that information (whether it per-
tains to the rival’s customers or costs) and whether the ﬁrms are Cournot or Bertrand competitors.
21 These results have been generalized and extended in Raith [1996] who shows that the decision depends on
whether the private information is of the independent– or common–values form (the information only directly
aﬀects the disclosing ﬁrm’s payoﬀ or is information about a parameter that aﬀects both ﬁrms’ payoﬀs in a
common way) and whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements.
19Firms that have private information about a rival tell. Intuitively, the reason for this is that in
our setting, the disclosure depends solely on the strategic beneﬁts and costs of disclosing. In the
setting studied in the prior literature (ﬁrms have private information about their own payoﬀs), each
ﬁrm uses its private information to tailor its output or price choice to that private information
independent of the disclosure decision, and the ﬁrm’s rival understands this. Thus, there is an
additional “information eﬀect” associated with the disclosure in the prior literature that is absent
when the private information is about the ﬁrm’s rival.
Our result that each ﬁrm adopts a policy of disclosing any private information it has about a
rival indicates that there is unlikely to be a need to substitute mandatory for voluntary disclosure
of this type of information. Each ﬁrm has suﬃcient incentives to include such information about
its rivals in its public disclosures. It also has implications for the information transfer literature.
The idea in this literature is that one ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial disclosures can be used to make inferences
about the performance or ﬁnancial well–being of its rivals (Baginski 1987, Pownall and Waymire
1989, Ramnath 2002, Gleason, Jenkins and Johnson 2008 or Kim, Lacina and Park 2008). Our
study indicates that information the disclosing ﬁrm has about a rival will also be included in its
disclosures. If so, then distinguishing the diﬀerent information included in a disclosure may allow
for a clearer understanding of any information externalities associated with the disclosure.
Finally, we complete the analysis of a ﬁrm’s incentives to disclose by considering its ex post
disclosure choice. Absent inhibitions (costs or additional uncertainty), the standard unraveling
result—that the ﬁrm discloses every realization of its private information—obtains. If, instead,
there are costs of disclosure the ﬁrm only discloses if its private information is suﬃciently good
news for the disclosing ﬁrm. Interestingly, whether this disclosure is good or bad news for the
rival depends on both whether the ﬁrm has private information about the rival’s customers or
production costs and whether the ﬁrms are Bertrand or Cournot competitors. We further show
that the decision to only disclose its private information if it is suﬃciently good news for the
disclosing ﬁrm does not depend on whether or not the rival does or does not disclose its private
information. However, the probability of a voluntary disclosure does depend on both whether the
rival discloses and the degree to which the ﬁrms’ products are substitutes.
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2E[ai] − tE[aj] − 2E[ci]+tE[cj]

and equilibrium proﬁts in this stage of the game are πC
i (di,d j)=[ qi(di,d j)]2 for i =1 ,2;j  = i.
Proof:F i r mi solves maxqi E[(ai − qi − tqj − ci)qi | φi] which yields the ﬁrst order condition
qi =( 1 /2)E[(ai − tqj − ci) | φi]. Each of the cases diﬀer in that the ﬁrms’ information sets are
diﬀerent. For example, if both have committed to disclose, then both know ai,a j,c i and cj.I n
other words, the ﬁrms play a game of complete information and we obtain the standard result for
qi(D,D). If ﬁrm i has committed to disclose but ﬁrm j has not, then ﬁrm i does not learn ai and/or
ci. As a result, ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst order condition becomes qi =( 1 /2)(E[ai | φi]−tE[qj | φi]−E[ci | φi]).
In contrast, ﬁrm j knows all four parameters—two because they are its private information and two
because ﬁrm i has committed to disclose its private information. As a result, its ﬁrst order condition
becomes qj =( 1 /2)(aj − tqi − cj). Solving these equations produces qi(D,N) and, by symmetry
qi(N,D). The ﬁnal case, when both ﬁrms commit not to disclose, the ﬁrst order conditions are
qi =( 1 /2)E[ai − tqj − ci] i =1 ,2;j  = i. The reason is that neither ﬁrm’s private information is
useful in determining their equilibrium outputs. Solving this pair of equations yields qi(N,N). In
each case, substituting the equilibrium quantities into the ﬁrm’s objective function produces the
expression for proﬁts given in the Proposition.
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i =1 ,2;j  = i.




(pi−ci) | φi] which yields the ﬁrst order condition
pi = 1
2ξE[(ai −mtaj +tpj +ξci) | φi]. Again, each of the cases diﬀer in that the ﬁrms’ information
sets are diﬀerent. As before, if both have committed to disclose, both know all parameters and
therefore play a game of complete information which yields the standard result for pi(D,D). If
ﬁrm i has committed to disclose but ﬁrm j has not, then ﬁrm i does not learn ai and/or ci.A sa
result, ﬁrm i’s ﬁrst order condition becomes pi = 1
2ξ(E[ai | φi] − mtaj + tE[pj | φi]+ξE[ci | φi]).
In contrast, ﬁrm j knows all four parameters—two because they are its private information and
two because ﬁrm i has committed to disclose its private information. As a result, its ﬁrst order
condition becomes pi = 1
2ξ(ai − mtaj +tpj +ξci). Solving these equations produces pi(D,N) and,
by symmetry pi(N,D). The ﬁnal case, when both ﬁrms commit not to disclose, the ﬁrst order
conditions are pi = 1
2ξ

E[ai + tpj + ξci] −mtaj). Solving this pair of equations yields pi(N,N). In
each case, substituting the equilibrium quantities into the ﬁrm’s objective function produces the
expression for proﬁts given in the Proposition.
Theorem 1:( a ) When the ﬁrms’ private information is purely about its rival (m =0 ), then re-
gardless of whether the ﬁrms have private information about demand or costs,
and regardless of whether they are Bertrand or Cournot competitors, in the
unique equilibrium, both ﬁrms adopt the policy of disclosing their private in-
formation.
(b) When m =1 , the ﬁrm’s private information is about its rival’s market demand
and the ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors, in the unique equilibrium, neither ﬁrm
adopts the policy of disclosing its private information.
Proof: Our proof strategy is to show that E[πk
i (D,N)] > E[πk
i (N,N)] and then that E[πk
i (D,D)] >
E[πk
i (N,D)] to show that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is for both ﬁrms to commit
to disclose and then follow the equilibrium quantity (price) described in Proposition 1 (2) for
k = C,B.
Case 1: Cournot Competition. Direct computations show that E[πC




i (N,D)] = (t/(4−t2))2
Var[aj]+V ar[cj]

. Both diﬀerences in expected proﬁts
are positive because both variances are positive and so is (t/(4−t2))2. Thus, the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium when ﬁrms are Cournot competitors is to adopt the policy of disclosing
their private information regardless of whether the ﬁrm has private information about demand or
cost (or both).
Case 2: Bertrand Competition when m = 0. Direct computations show that E[πB
i (D,N)] −
E[πB
i (N,N)] = E[πB
i (D,D)] − E[πB
i (N,D)] = (t/(4 − t2))2
Var[aj]+V a r [ cj]

. Both diﬀerences
in expected proﬁts are positive because both variances are positive and so is (t/(4 − t2))2.T h u s ,
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors is to adopt the
policy of disclosing their private information regardless of whether the ﬁrm has private information
about demand or cost (or both).
Case 3: Bertrand Competition when m = 1. Since the value of m has no eﬀect on the ﬁrms’
disclosure decisions when they have private information about their rival’s costs, both ﬁrms adopt
the policy of disclosing their private information when they have private information about their
rival’s costs. (This is readily veriﬁed by direct computation.) Turning to the case when the ﬁrms
have private information about their rival’s demand, direct computations show that E[πB
i (D,N)]−
E[πB
i (N,N)] = E[πB
i (D,D)]− E[πB
i (N,D)] = −(t/(4− t2))2
Var[aj]

. Since the coeﬃcient on the
Var[aj], the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium when both ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors
and have private information about their rival’s demand is to adopt the policy of not disclosing
their private information.
22Lemma 1: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private in-
formation. If there are no costs to disclosure and no uncertainty about whether the ﬁrm has any
information at all, the unique voluntary disclosure equilibrium involves the ﬁrm disclosing its pri-
vate information regardless of whether it has private information about its rival’s customers or
production costs, regardless of whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are substitutes or complements, and
regardless of whether its rival does or does not disclose its private information.
Proof:L e txi ∈{ aj,c j} represent the realization of ﬁrm i’s private information, D be the set of
xi that ﬁrm i chooses to disclose and let N be the set of xi that ﬁrm i chooses not to disclose.
Case 1: Cournot Competition. Proposition 1 describes ﬁrm i’s equilibrium quantity choice and
equilibrium proﬁts both when it discloses xi and when it does not in two distinct environments—
when ﬁrm j disclosed its private information and when ﬁrm j d i dn o t .I np a r t i c u l a r ,ﬁ r mi’s payoﬀ
from disclosing when j did not (with a slight abuse of notation) is πC
i (xi ∈D;y) ≡ πC
i (D,y)
where y = N,D. Similarly, if ﬁrm i does not disclose, let πC
i (xi ∈N;y) ≡ πC
i (N,y) where again
y = N,D. Note that the latter payoﬀ is independent of the value of xi while the former are
decreasing in aj and increasing in cj for y = N,D.
The monotonicity of πC
i (xi ∈D;y)i nxi for y = N,D ensures that D and N are, in equilibrium,
intervals. To see why, suppose not. If xi = aj, then there are values of aj such that a1 >a 2
with a1 ∈D,a 2 ∈N.S i n c ea1 ∈D means that πC
i (a1 ∈D;y) >π C
i (a1 ∈N;y)a n da2 ∈N
means that πC
i (a2 ∈D;y) <π C
i (a2 ∈N;y)f o ry = N,D. However, since πC
i (aj ∈D;y)i s
monotonically decreasing in aj, this produces a contradiction and so both D and N are intervals.
Next, let the critical value that separates D and N be a∗
j. In equilibrium, this critical value would
be deﬁned as the solution to πC
i (a∗
j;y)=E [ πC
i (aj;y) | aj ∈ [a∗
j,a h
j]]. However, the monotonicity
of πC
i (aj ∈D;y) ensures that πC
i (a∗
j;y) > E[πC
i (aj;y) | aj ∈ [a∗
j,a h
j]] for any a∗
j (except when
a∗
j = a 
j, in which case they are equal). As a result, the unique equilibrium has the ﬁrm voluntarily
disclosing every realization of its private information. (A similar argument using the fact that
πC
i (cj ∈D;y) is monotonically increasing in cj ensures that both D and N are intervals when
the ﬁrm’s private information is about its rival’s production costs and that the unique equilibrium
has the ﬁrm voluntarily disclosing every realization of its private information in this case too.)
Case 2: Bertrand Competition. Proposition 2 describes ﬁrm i’s equilibrium price choice and
equilibrium proﬁts when it discloses xi and when it does not in two distinct environments—when
ﬁrm j disclosed its private information and when ﬁrm j did not. Analogous reasoning to that in
Case 1 but noting that ﬁrm i’s payoﬀs from disclosure are both increasing in the realized values of
aj and cj completes the proof.
Theorem 2: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private
information. If costs of disclosure are not prohibitive, the ﬁrm voluntarily discloses its private
information if it is suﬃciently good news for the ﬁrm regardless of whether it has private informa-
tion about its rival’s customers or production costs, regardless of whether the ﬁrms’ strategies are
substitutes or complements and regardless of whether its rival does or does not disclose its private
information.
Proof: Focusing ﬁrst on the case when the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors and ﬁrm i has private
information about its rival’s customers, aj, we can make use of the proof of Lemma 1 to show that




j;y) − κ =E [ πC
i (aj;y) | aj ∈ [a∗
j,a h
j]].




i (aj;y) | aj ∈ [a∗
j,a h
j]] is monotonically decreasing in a∗
j ensuring that there is a
23unique solution to (A1) as long as the cost of disclosure, κ, is not prohibitive. Similarly reasoning
shows that there is a unique interior critical value for the remaining cases.
Corollary 2: Assume that ﬁrms make voluntary disclosure choices after learning their private
information. If costs of disclosure are not prohibitive and the ﬁrms are Bertrand competitors,
the probability that the ﬁrm chooses to voluntarily disclose its private information about its rival
is increasing in how close substitutes the ﬁrms’ products are (how large t is). If the ﬁrm’s are
Cournot competitors, the result holds so long as the ﬁrms’ markets are suﬃciently similar.22
Proof: Case 1, Cournot Competition: If the ﬁrm’s private information is about the rival’s customers





(Proposition 1) and the critical
value deﬁning the largest value of aj that is disclosed, say Aj,s a t i s ﬁ e sH(Aj;t,dj) ≡ πC
i (Aj;dj)−
E[πC
i (aj;dj) | aj ∈ [Aj,a h
j]] = κ (Theorem 2). Since ∂Aj/∂t > 0i f∂H/∂t > 0, we need to compute
∂πC
i /∂t and ∂2πC






























− (4 + 3t2)E[ai − ci | dj]+t(4 + t2)(aj − cj)

.
If −(4+ 3t2)E[ai − ci | dj]+t(4 + t2)(aj − cj) < 0 then both are negative, H increases in t and so
does Aj. Since the set of aj the ﬁrm discloses [a 
j,A j], the probability of disclosure increases in t.
Analogous calculations yields the same result if the ﬁrm’s private information is cj instead.
Case 2, Bertrand Competition: Since we are assuming that m = 0, without loss of generality we
can take the ﬁrms’ demand curves to be qi = ai−pi+tpj which implies that πB
i (D,dj)=( pi−E[ci |
dj])2. If the ﬁrm’s private information is about the rival’s customers, then the critical value deﬁning
the smallest value of aj that is disclosed, say Aj,s a t i s ﬁ e sG(Aj;t,dj) ≡ πC
i (Aj;dj)−E[πC
i (aj;dj) |
aj ∈ [Aj,a h
j]] = κ (Theorem 2). Again, ∂Aj/∂t > 0i f∂G/∂t > 0, we need to compute ∂πB
i /∂t
and ∂2πB























In this case, both are positive and so G increases in t. Thus, the critical value (Aj) declines and
so the probability of disclosure increases. Analogous calculations yield the same result if the ﬁrm’s
private information is cj instead.
22 “Suﬃciently similar” means that E[ai − ci | dj]/(aj − cj) >t (4 + t2)/(4 + 3t2).
246. References.
Arya, A., H. Frimor and B. Mittendorf, 2010. “Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary Information
in a Multi–Segment Firm,” Management Science, vol. 56 (4), 645–658.
Arya, A., J. Glover and S. Sunder, 1998. “Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle,”
Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 3 (1–2), 7–34.
Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf, 2007. “The Interaction Among Disclosure, Competition Between
Firms and Analyst Following,” Journal of Accounting & Economics, vol. 43 (2–3), 321–339.
Baginski, S., 1987. “Intraindustry Transfers Associated with Management Forecasts of Earnings,”
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 25 (2), 196–216.
Bagnoli, M. and T. Bergstrom. 2005. “Log–Concave Probability and its Applications,” Economic
Theory, vol. 26 (2), 445-469.
Bagnoli, M. and S. Watts, 2010. “Oligopoly, Earnings Management and Disclosure,” The Account-
ing Review, vol. 85 (4), 1191–1214.
Bower, T., 2009. Oil: Money, Politics and Power in the 21st Century, Grand Central Publishing,
New York, NY.
Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, 1985. “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes
and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 93 (3), 488–511.
Carr, M. 2003. Super Searchers on Competitive Intelligence, Cyberage Books, Medford, NJ.
Christensen, P. and G. Feltham, 2002. Economics of Accounting: Information in Markets, Springer,
New York, NY.
Currarini, S. and F. Feri, 2007. “Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly,” University of Venice
working paper.
Darrough, M., 1993. “Disclosure Policy and Competition: Cournot vs. Bertrand,” The Accounting
Review, vol. 68 (3), 534–561.
Davenport, T. and J. Harris, 2007. Competing on Analytics, Harvard Business School Press,
Boston, MA.
Dietrich, J., 1989. “Discussion of Voluntary Disclosure Choice and Earnings Transfer,” Journal of
Accounting Research, vol. 27 (Supplement), 106–110.
Dye, R., 1985. “Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information,” Journal of Accounting Research,v o l .
23 (1), 123–145.
Fischer, P. and P. Stocken, 2004. “Eﬀect of Investor Speculation on Earnings Management,”
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 42 (5), 843–870.
Fischer, P. and R. Verrecchia, 2000. “Reporting Bias,” The Accounting Review, vol. 75 (2),
229–245.
Fischer, P. and R. Verrecchia, 2004. “Disclosure Bias,” Journal of Accounting & Economics,v o l .
38 (3), 233–250.
Fleisher, C. and B. Bensoussan, 2007. Business and Competitive Analysis, FT Press, Upper Saddles
River, NJ.
Fuld, L., 2006. The Secret Language of Competitive Intelligence, Crown Business, New York, NY.
Gal–Or, E., 1985. “Information Sharing in Oligopoly,” Econometrica, vol. 53 (2), 329–344.
Gal–Or, E., 1986. “Information Transmission—Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, vol. 53 (1), 85–92.
Gleason, C., N. Jenkins, and W. Johnson, 2008. “The Contagion Eﬀects of Accounting Restate-
ments,” The Accounting Review. vol. 83 (1), 83–110.
25Grossman, S., 1981. “The Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality,”
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 24 (3), 461–483.
Kim, Y., M. Lacina and M. Park, 2008. “Positive and Negative Information Transfers from Man-
agement Forecasts,” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 46 (4), 885–908.
Liebowitz, J., 2006. Strategic Intelligence, Auerbach Publications, New York, NY.
Maleug, D. and S. Tsutsui, 1996. “Duopoly Information Exchange: The Case of Unknown Slope,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 14 (1), 119–136.
Milgrom, P., 1981. “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,” Bell
Journal of Economics, vol. 12 (2), 380–391.
Pownall, G. and G. Waymire, 1989. “Voluntary Disclosure Choice and Earnings Information
Transfer,” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 27 (Supplement), 85–105.
Prescott, J. and S. Miller, 2001. Proven Strategies in Competitive Intelligence: Lessons From the
Trenches, John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.
Raith, M., 1996. “A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 71 (2), 260–288.
Ramnath, S., 2002. “Investor and Analyst Reactions to Earnings Announcements of Related Firms:
An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 40 (5), 1351–1376.
Stocken, P., 2000. “Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure,” Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 31 (2),
359–374.
Stocken, P. and R. Verrecchia, 2004. “Financial Reporting System Choice and Disclosure Manage-
ment,” The Accounting Review, vol. 79 (4), 1181–1203.
Verrecchia, R., 1983. “Discretionary Disclosure,” Journal of Accounting & Economics, vol. 5 (1),
179–194.
Vives, X., 1984. “Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand,” Journal of Economic
Theory, vol. 34 (1), 71–94.
Vives, X., 2008. “Information Sharing Among Firms,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
Online, S. Durlauf and L. Blume editors, 2nd Edition.
(http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/dictionary)
26